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ABSTRACT 
The issue of foreign aid dependency in African countries remains controversial among policy 
makers.So far, there is no consensus on aid effectiveness and the resulting policy prescriptions 
have been conflicting. The Euro zone which provides the bulk of foreign aid to developing 
countries, is currently implementing fiscal consolidation and some austerity programs. It is 
against this background that this study raises the question: What effects will such fiscal 
consolidation have on foreign aid flows? Therefore, the value of this study is the 
investigationofwhat really matters:The quantity or quality of foreign aid to support economic 
growth?We assess these issues within the framework of a country’s legal origin. The quantity 
effects are proxied by the quadratic term on the aid variable. Source-based proxies are used to 
measure the quality of aid effects. Our findings suggest that both quality and quantity of aid 
matters and that these effects differ based on a country’s legal origin.
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2I. Introduction
Overseas development assistance (ODA) or foreign aid, remain the largest source of external 
financing of the development of least developed countries (LDCs).  At the recent 2011 United 
Nations (UN) conference on LDCs, a renewed call was made for increased foreign aid flows to 
LDCs [targeted at approximately 0.15% to 0.20% of gross national income for development 
assistance committee (DAC) members]. Yet, little conclusive empirical evidence exists in 
support of growth enhancing effects from foreign aid. For example, some studies have found 
neutral effects (Boone, 1996; Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004 and Easterly, 2007a, 2007b, 
2005) while others have found growth depressing effects (Bobba and Powell, 2007). Other 
scholars have argued that aid can be growth enhancing under good macroeconomic policies 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002) and favorable structural characteristics 
(Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp, 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 2001).Nevertheless, proponents have 
recommended increasing foreign aid flows, especially to countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
(UNDP, 2005; IMF and World Bank, 2005; European Commission, 2005; Sachs, 2005), citing
that the current quantity is not sufficient to provide the needed “big push” in order for these 
countries to leapfrog out of the poverty trap.
The issue of foreign aid dependency in African countries remains controversial among
scholars, policy makers and international organizations. Asian economies that were at the same 
income level with some of the African economies in the 1950s have now emerged as the “newly 
industrialized” countries, with their economic growth largely driven by market fundamentals
rather than foreign aid. The inability of African countries to wean themselves from foreign aid 
and duplicate the Asian miracle has puzzled many policy makers. Particularly, Africa has lagged 
other developing regions in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and competitively 
participating in international trade, the two major drivers of long term economic growth.
Critiques have been quick to blame both the donors (for crippling interference in Africa’s 
development policies and in some cases, for not providing the right quantity and quality of aid)
and the ‘corrupt’ government agenciesin some of the recipient countries (Calderisi, 2006; Moyo, 
2009; Shah, 2012); with some scholars concluding that foreign aid is simply ineffective in the 
tropics (Dalgaard et al., 2004; Roodman, 2004). 
3Nonetheless, African economies have made significant efforts to attract other forms of 
capital, but their efforts have been disappointing at best. For example, the pursuit of 
comprehensive macroeconomic policies under the IMF structural adjustment programs that were 
introduced in the 1980s, combined with an accelerated pace of liberalization, deregulation and 
privatization did not yield the anticipated surge in foreign direct investment activities, neither 
have these efforts diversified the export base in these countries (World Bank, 1997; IMF, 
1999,UNCTAD, 2005). Additionally, sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have been
particularly diligent in establishing export processing zones, signing investment treaties and 
generally providing a favorable investment climate more than any other developing countries 
outside of Asia, without attracting the expected FDI (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003). And although 
the stock of FDI in the region has increased significantly since the 1980s, albeit at low levels 
compared to other developing regions, a large proportion of it is concentrated in oil and mineral 
rich countries (Basu and Srinivasan, 2002). Mounting external debt (especially in the heavily 
indebted poor countries), weak economic institutions, poor governance and the heavy 
dependency on the primary sector are some of the persistent factors that have continued to 
cripple the region and keep it in the cycle of foreign aid dependency. 
The most vulnerable of the developing countries and the most highly advocated (by the 
international community) for increased aid flow, are the LDCs. It is not surprising that 69% of 
these LDCs are in Africa and 83% of those Africa’s LDCs are also classified as heavily indebted 
poor countries (HIPCs). These countries have low savings rate, undiversified tax-base, and 
limited access to international capital markets and despite liberalizing their capital accounts, their 
domestic financial markets are weak and in some cases, missing. A combination of weak or 
underdeveloped financial markets and capital account liberalization can have dire consequences 
in terms of increasing a country’s vulnerability to financial volatility, deterring long term FDI 
(Hermes and Lensink, 2003; UNCTAD, 1996b) and even attracting short term capital that has 
unfavorablegrowth effects (Lensink and Morrissey, 2002). Furthermore, poor financial 
institutions can also affect a country’s absorptive capacity of foreign aid, with real effects on 
economic growth (Berg, Hussain, Aiyar, Roache, Mirzoev and Mahone, 2006; Gupta, Powell 
and Yang, 2005). 
Accordingly, the goal of this paper is to assess the economic impact of the foreign aid on the 
recently observed positive economic growth in LDCs while controlling for policy, institutional, 
4and key economic factors. In contrast to previous studies, we provide an analysis of the impact of 
aid in terms of its quantity and quality withinthe framework of Africa’s least developed 
countries’ legal origins. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998)argue that a country’s legal origin can be a good 
predictor of the nature and efficiency of its institutions and policy formulation environment. The 
French civil law, relative to the English common law tradition, for example, is associated with 
less efficient contract enforcement, heavy hand of government ownership and regulation and,
possible higher corruption. French civil law embraces “socially-conditioned private contracting,”  
in contrast to the English common law, which supports “unconditioned private 
contracting”(Pistor, 2006; Damaška,1986). Unlike other developing countries, African countries 
maintain strong colonial ties (UNCTAD, 2005). In many cases these countries have made little 
or no changes to their constitution since independence and such status quo is reflective of the 
quality and efficiency of their institutions and policy formulation environment. Thus, by 
evaluating aid effectiveness within the context of a country’s legal origin, we are able to control 
for the impact of institutions (Dalgaard et al., 2004) and policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) 
without introducing proxies that have their own shortcomings (Dalgaard et al., 2004; Lensink 
and White, 2000). Furthermore, all the countries in our sample are within the tropical climate. 
This allows us to put to test the generalization in Dalgaard et al (2004) that foreign aid is 
ineffective in the tropics. 
In the empirical analysis, we employ generalized method of moments(GMM) and fixed 
effects (FE) techniques to estimate growth regression model over the period of 1984-2010. The 
role of the quantity of aid is assessed by introducing a quadratic term on the total aid variable. 
The quality of aid on the other hand, is measured using various source-based proxies. We use 
four specifications of bilateral aid, which captures the geostrategic aspect of foreign aid, and 
Multilateral aid from United Nations agencies (UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNTA, UNHCR and 
WFP1)] that measures the non-geostrategic component. Two models are estimated. Inthe first 
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UNDP (United Nations Development Programs).UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). United Nations 
Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF)’s goal is to nurture and care for children by working with stakeholders to overcome the 
obstacles that poverty, violence, disease and discrimination place in a child’s path. The agency’s focus  include promoting girls’ 
education, advocating for children immunization against common childhood diseases, preventing HIV/Aids among young people, 
providing safe environment for children and promoting equality among those who are discriminated against, girls and women in 
particular. United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)’s mission is to provide a world where every pregnancy is wanted, every 
birth is safe and every young person’s potential is fulfilled. World Food Program (WFP) uses food aid to support economic and 
social development; meet refugee and other emergency food needs, and the associated logistics support; and promote world food 
security in accordance with the recommendations of United Nations and food and agriculture organization (FAO). United 
5model we enter the aid variables as standalone and in the second model, these variables are 
interacted with a dummy variable for the country’s legal origins. 61% of the countries in the 
sample have French and 31% have British legal origins. Consequently only dummy variables for 
French and British legal origins are used. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of related 
literature, section III describes the methodology and the data, while Section IV presents the 
results of the empirical analysis followed by concluding remarks in Section V.
II. Related Literature Review
There are three strands of literature that explain the foreign aid – growth relationship in poor 
countries: the takeoff hypothesis, the conditionality requirement and the “timing and type of aid”
argument. The takeoff hypothesisstrand advocates for increased flow of foreign aid to poor 
countries (Sachs, 2005). The underlying argument hinges on the fact that poor countries face a 
big financing gap. As a result, their physical capital accumulation has failed to keep up with the 
depreciation and the high population growth rates2. The financing gap is caused by among other 
factors; their low domestic savings, limited and undiversified tax base and poor access to 
traditional international capital markets. As a result, they lack sufficient capital stock required to 
lift them above the subsistence level onto a more accelerate and rapid development path. In other 
words, there exists a threshold level3 of capital stock, beyond which capital begins to have
meaningful growth enhancing effects. Therefore, a reasonable and sustained flow of foreign aid 
can help these countries meet and surpass that minimum capital stock, necessary for the takeoff
into self sustained growth4 (UNDP, 2005; IMF and World Bank, 2005). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Nations Transitions authority (UNTA) ensures the implementation of the agreements of the comprehensive political settlement of 
countries in post conflict. It establishes a unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transition 
period, independence and unit of a country are enshrined. The mandate given to UNTA includes aspects relating to human rights, 
the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of 
law and order, the repatriation and settlement of the refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of essential structures 
in the country during the transition period. 
2
See Galor and Weil, 1996, 2000 for discussions on the linkage between population growth and capital accumulation
3See an example in Sachs (2005, page 250) regarding an impassable road due to a missing bridge for further explanation on the 
threshold effects.
4For more discussions on the takeoff hypothesis, please see Easterly, William, 2006. “Reliving the 1950s: The Big Push, Poverty 
Traps and Takeoffs in Economic Development”.Journal of Economic Growth. Vol. 11(4), pp289-318
6Empirical studies have attempted to incorporate this concavity of physical capital – growth 
relationship by including both the linear and non-linear specifications of foreign aid in the 
growth equation. The non-linear term is either entered as a standalone (Dalgaard and Hansen, 
2001; Lensik and White, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani, 2004; Rajan 
and Subramanian, 2008; Moreira, 2005) or as an interaction with a policy variable (Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000). The sign on the non-linear term has varied across studies. However, in line with 
the takeoff hypothesis, it is expected for the linear term to have a negative sign, while the 
quadratic term to have a positive sign. 
Anecdotal evidence providessome hint as to why the quadratic term has not fared 
consistently in empirical analysis. For example, there are some poor countries in Africa that have 
received relatively large amount of aid for prolonged periods of time with no improvement in 
their economic growth and poverty reduction. Easterly (2006), points out that a large proportion 
of these aid flows have been used in some cases, to finance growth-retarding government 
consumption rather than growth-enhancing public investment. Other examples point to the 
mismatch between donor objectives5and development needs of African countries (Calderisi, 
2006; Shah, 2012)
The second strand of literature (conditionality strand) holds that certain conditions in the aid 
recipient country must be in place before foreign aid effects on growth can be realized. The 
championing study in this line of argument is that of Burnside and Dollar (2000). This study 
examines the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth within certain 
macroeconomic policies environment. They use a sample of fifty six developing countries, with 
the data averaged over 4-year periods, starting with 1970-73 to 1990-1993. They concluded that 
aid tends to be more effective in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies (as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term between 
aid and their calculated policy index). Nonetheless, when they interact the non-linear 
specification of aid with the policy index, the resulting coefficient is insignificant (with a 
negative sign) – putting more emphasize on the policy rather than the surge in aid as predicted in 
the takeoff hypothesis. 
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Examples include donors using aid disbursements to financing poorly conceived ‘white-elephant’ projects; aid serving as a 
carrot for donor countries to gain access to poor countries goods markets while denying market access for poor countries 
products; and, in some cases, rich countries using aid to dump their highly subsidized agricultural products at the expense of the 
poor countries agricultural sector.
7Despite the numerous criticisms of the Burnside and Dollar [see Lensink and White, 2000; 
Easterly 2003; Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004] approach and their emphasis on the policy 
condition, other studies have also arrived at a similar conclusion (Collier and Dollar, 2002). 
Nevertheless, critics have provided competing evidence, suggesting, for example, that 
geographical factors, which account for “deep structural” characteristics, rather than policies, are 
keys in determining the effectiveness of foreign aid on growth (Dalgaard et al., 2004; Roodman, 
2004). Geographical factors, for example, may affect productivity, especially in the agricultural 
sector (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2001, 2003 and Masters and McMillan, 2001) and may 
also have influence on slow moving structural characteristics such as institutions (Easterly and 
Levine, 2003 and Acemoglu, Simon and James, 2002). Dalgaard et al. (2004) captures the 
conditional effects of aid on economic growth by interacting aid with the proportion of land in 
the tropics. Based on their empirical analysis, they provide a convincing conclusion that their 
findings (that aid is ineffective in the tropics) are superior to those based on policy interaction 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000) and concavity effects (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001).  Roodman
(2004) asserted that foreign aid works well outside of the tropic and not in the tropical countries. 
However, Radelet, Clemens and Bhavnani, (2005) dismisses the validity of geographical factors 
as merely a separation of countries where aid has worked from those countries where it has 
failed, rather than an explanation of a causation of aid ineffectiveness. 
The third strand of literature incorporates some of the elements from the aforementioned two 
strands with an additional twist. They account for the quality of aid and the timing of aid effects 
on growth (Clemens,Radelet, Bhavnani and Bazzi, 2011; Minoiu and Reddy, 2009; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008; Headey, 2007; Bobba and Powell, 2007; Clemens et al., 2004). In reference 
to the quality of aid, these studies distinguish between multilateral aid6 and bilateral aid and, 
further, separate development aid (non-geostrategic) from non-development aid (geostrategic7).   
They conclude that aid flows based on geostrategic factors have neutral effects on growth, while 
the non-geostrategic aid has growth enhancing effects (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bobba 
and Powell, 2007). 
Timing of the aid impact also matters in determining the aid-growth relationship (Clemens et. 
al, 2011). For example, Clemens et al. (2004) find that aid allocated to sectors such as 
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It is generally assumed that multilateral aid tends to be development in nature.
7Aid disbursed to political allies regardless of a country’s policy and institutional environment. For example, Israel and Egypt 
have benefited from aid flows from United States due to regional strategic reasons.
8agriculture, industry and public infrastructure investment tend to have immediate/short run 
impact on growth, relative to aid supporting democracy, environment, health and education, 
which usually has postponed/late impact on growth. Overall, development aid (aid allocated 
towards investment spending),will tend to have immediate/direct impact on the economy and 
support long run economic growth, while non-development aid (aid responding to disasters or 
social issues) will tend to have indirect impact on economic growth. Therefore, effects stemming 
from development aid are more likely to be captured in the short run data relative to those 
coming from non-development aid (Clemens et al, 2011).  
An area that has received little attention in the aid-growth literature is how aid effects are 
transmitted to growth.Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2002) attempted to address the
transmission question. Using a sample of 25 sub-Saharan African countries over the period of 
1970-1997, they find that aid effects are transmitted to growth via investment spending. They
dismiss government consumption spending (established in White, 1998; and more recently, in 
White and Dijkstra, 2003) as a possible transmission mechanism.  They also find that while aid 
has some effects on imports, imports do not matter in growth.Boone (1996) also provided 
evidence supporting the positive relationship between aid and investment. 
Generally, empirical studies have yielded divergent evidence on aid-growth linkage8.These
divergent results, according to Clemens et.al (2011), are due to; (i) lack of controlling of the 
timing of aid effects on growth and, (ii) using invalid and/or weak instrumental variables. 
Particularly, results in the leading studies [Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008] in the aid-growth literature rests their strength of accounting for aid 
endogeneity primarily on population growth.  To resolve this divergence, Clemens et al (2011) 
incorporates three changes in the three leading studies. First, they allow aid to affect growth with 
a time lag. Second, they first-difference the data to remove the effects of time invariant omitted 
variables. Third, they disaggregateaid data into “early impact” and late impact” components. By 
incorporate these changes they arrive at a harmonized conclusion that aid has modest growth-
enhancing effects. 
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For example, there is substantial evidence of neutral effects of aid on growth (Easterly, 2007a, 2007b, 2005; Easterly, Levine 
and Roodman, 2004; Boone, 1996). Others have found depressing effects (Bobba and Powell, 2007). Yet, some have found 
positive relationship between aid and growth (Clemens, et al, 2004; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000).
9III. Methodology and Data
The empirical model investigates the impact of foreign aid on economic growth while 
controlling for various growth determinants. The primary objectives are to assess; 1) whether
quantity or quality of foreign aid matters to the economic growth of recipient countries9, and, 2)
whether these effects differ based on a country’s legal origin. Two models are estimated.  In the 
first model we enter the aid variables as standalone and in the second model, these variables are 
interacted with a dummy variable of the country’s legal origin.Specifically, two dummy 
variables are used; a dummy variable for French legal origin (dFrench) takes a value of one for 
former French colonies and zero otherwise. The British dummy variable (dBritish) equally takes 
a value of one for former British colonies and zero otherwise. The baseline model is as outlined 
in equation (1):
∆ݕ௜௧ = ߚ0+ߚ1ݕ௜௧−ఛ + ߚ2ܱܦܣ௜௧−ఛ +  ߚ3ܱܦܣ2௜௧−ఛ + ߚ4ܱ݌݁݊௜௧−ఛ + ߚ5ܫ݊ݒ௜௧−ఛ +
ߚ6ܨ݅ݏܿ݅ݐ−߬+ߚ7ܫ݂݈݊݅ݐ−߬+ߚ8ܲ݋݈݅ݐݕ2݅ݐ−߬+ߚ9ܴ݁ݏ݅ݐ−߬+ߚ10ܶ݋ݐ݃ݎ݅ݐ−߬+ߚ11ܲ݋݌݃݅ݐ+ߚ12ܨܦ
݅ݐ−߬+ߝ݅ݐ (1)
Δyit is the average annual growth rate of output per capita in country i between the yearst and 
t-τ, where τ takes the value of 3. In line with the growth literature, we average the growth rate 
across 3-year non-overlapping periods. All independent variables are initial values at the 
beginning of each 3-year period with the exception of the terms of trade growth (Totgr), which is
averaged over the 3-year period. 
The major right-hand side variable of interest is Foreign aid (ODA). The ODA variable takes 
various forms to measure the quantity and quality aspects of foreign aid.  The quantity aspect is 
proxied by thequadratic term on the net official development assistance received (as a percentage 
of GDP) variable (ODA2). Due to lack of more appropriate measures of quality of foreign aid, we 
use source-based proxies.  
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Shah (2012)argues that donor countries have not lived up to their promises on both quantity and quality of aid.
10
The first proxy isbilateral aid. In addition to total bilateral aid, we include aid from France 
and United Kingdom, given that countries in our sample are associated with either French (61%) 
or British (31%) legal origins.  Bilateral aid fromthe European Union (EU) is also included on 
the basis that collectively, EU member countries are the biggest foreign aid donors to African
countries. We assume that a large proportion of bilateral aid is geostrategic in nature. UK and 
France in particular tend to direct most of its bilateral aid to its former colonies, with non-
democratic colonies receiving almost two times more aid than democratic non-colonies 
(Minoiuand Reddy, 2009). We expect such geostrategic aid, which is dispersed regardless of the 
country’s policy environment and political institutions, to have undesirable impact on economic 
growth relative to non-geostrategic aid. 
The second proxy is aid from multilateral agencies: UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNTA, 
UNHCR, UNTA and WFP. We assume that the effects of multilateral aid from UN agencies 
depend on the goals and objectives of that agency. For example, the goal of United Nations 
Development Programs (UNDP) is to help countries achieve their development objectives. 
UNDP works with individual countries in areas including; poverty reduction, democratic 
governance, crisis prevention and recovery, environment and energy and HIV/Aids. Therefore, 
we expect aid from UNDP to have favorable impact on growth relative to aid from United 
Nations High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR), which respond to growth-retarding crisis. 
The growth impact of aid from World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), United Nations Transition Authority (UNTA) and United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) are undetermined prior to conducting empirical analysis. WFP, UNICEF and UNFPA 
provide aid that support social programs. Most social programs such as those related to health 
and education are imperfectly correlated with income and may often have unnoticeable short run 
impact on growth. Nevertheless, countries that have laid a good foundation of human capital (for 
example, the East Asian countries, China and Vietnam) have managed to shift to high growth 
performance relative to those that adopted the growth-centric approach while neglecting social 
development (Ranis, Stewart, Ramirez, 2000; White, 1999b).
The growth literature (Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, 
Miller, 2004) guides us in selecting the core set of growth determinants; however the estimated 
model variables are constrained by the available data. The initial level of output per capita ( ity  )
is included to test for the presence of β-convergence. The argument that good policies are a 
11
precondition for aid effectiveness has been widely debated since Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
While the disagreements are obvious, there is hardly any contention on the importance of good 
macroeconomic policies for economic growth. Therefore, we include three policy variables: 
trade, fiscal and monetary policies. Because of the inconclusive results in literature on the 
interaction between aid and policy10 measures, we do not include that interaction term in this 
study.
Starting in the early 1980s, developing countries experienced a wave of macroeconomic 
policy shifts away from import protection, managed exchange rates, and targeted subsidies 
towards trade, investment and financial market liberalization. The objectives of the policy shift 
were believed, among other factors, to positively affect a country’s economic growth by 
increasing the competitiveness and efficiency of the export sector and overall improving the 
production efficiency in the domestic market. Consequently, we expect trade openness (Open), 
measured as the percentage of merchandise trade11 (imports + exports) in GDP, to positively 
enhance economic growth. 
Monetary policy (Infl) is proxied by the CPI inflation rate (Fischer, 1993), specified as the 
logarithm of (1+ inflation rate). Fiscal policy on the other hand is proxied by the government 
consumption spending (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Barro, 1991). As a fiscal policy instrument, 
government consumption expenditure (Fisc) can be used during economic downturns to 
stimulate aggregate demand and output through the Keynesian effect. However, if the spending 
is politically motivated or is a result of corruption, it could have negative consequences on the 
medium and long run economic growth. 
Good governance, political stability and well developed financial markets all provide 
conducive environment for economic growth (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005). Particularly, proponents of the free market system 
argue that in countries where the role of the government is limited, for example, to providing 
public goods such as infrastructure and public security, maintaining the rule of law, and 
enforcing contracts, not only reduces social discontent but also ensures a healthy private sector 
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Several studies have tested the interaction between aid and the Burnside and Dollar (2000) policy index and they found the 
interaction to be insignificant (see Easterly et.al, 2003; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2001 and Lensink and 
White, 2001).
11
Because the share of merchandise trade in GDP is a policy outcome, a better proxy would include a policy instrument such as 
data on tariff or other non-tariff barriers. However, we do not have comprehensive data on these policy instruments and therefore 
we use policy outcome variables as proxies.
12
competition, which promotes productivity and growth. Furthermore, a country with good 
governance is also more likely to promote growth enhancing policies.
Polity2 index from the Polity IV Project (2011) is used as a proxy for governance. The index 
is measured on a scale of -10 to +10; with -10 indicating strongly autocratic (political 
suppression) and +10 a strongly democratic (political freedom) political system. Barro (1994) 
assessed the effects of democracy on growth using a sample of 100 countries from 1960 to 1990 
and found that after controlling for all other core determinants of growth democracy had a weak 
negative effect on growth. 
The proportion of money supply (M2) in GDP is used as a proxy for the depth of the 
financial market development (FD). King and Levine (1993) evaluated the effects of money 
supply12(expressed as a share of GDP) and three other alternative measures of financial market 
development and concluded that higher levels of financial market development accelerate 
economic growth. Additionally, they showed that the effects based on the money supply measure 
were stronger in poor countries. Similarly, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) established a 
positive relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
The need to control for the rate of population growth in aid-growth regressions was 
highlighted in Easterly (2006). Increased population growth can penalize economic growth in a 
number of ways. It can divert resources away from production goods to reproduction related 
consumption (Becker and Barro, 1988). It can also penalize the steady state level of output per 
worker in the neoclassical growth model. Specifically, if the population is growing faster than 
the level of economic growth, then a portion of the economy’s investment is allocated towards 
providing capital for new workers, rather than increasing capital per worker (Barro, 1994). These 
effects can have undesirable implications on aid effectiveness. On the other hand, declining 
population growth rates can be an indication of the development of social institutions such as 
healthcare and education (which expands with economic growth) (Schultz, 1989; Behrman, 1990 
and Barro and Lee, 1994).
Population growth is also often used as a proxy for the rate of growth of labor input in the 
production process. In studies on African economies, population growth, especially in urban 
areas, has been found to be a strong determinant of infrastructure development and other key 
                                                     
12 They caution that money supply (M2 or M3) as a share of GDP does not capture the quality of the financial market 
development. However, the bias that may arise from the quality effects is not central to this study.  
13
institutions such as the financial sector (Allen, Carletti, Cull, Qian, Senbet, and Valenzuela, 
2012). For these reasons, the sign of the population growth rate (Popg) coefficient is unpredicted 
prior to our empirical investigation. Furthermore, we include a measure of investment (Inv), 
which captures the effects of domestic investment activities on growth. Terms of trade growth 
(Totgr) controls for external shocks, while measures of oil and ores resources (Res) take into 
account the resources endowment in some of the LDCs. 
We also address a number of methodological issues. The averaged dependent variable 
controls for the effects of short-run cyclical fluctuations and minimizes the impact of outliers. 
Endogeneity bias may arise due to the potential endogeneity of growth determinants, such as 
foreign aid, openness, government consumption spending, and investment. On the other hand, 
there is a possibility that low growth may cause increased foreign aid flows and vis-a-vis, or, that 
both foreign aid and growth maybe jointly determined by a third variable. In such instances, the 
model will suffer from reverse causality and simultaneity bias. By using initial level of foreign 
aid, we are able to control for the reverse causality bias. Other biases that may affect the 
consistency of the estimates include the heterogeneity (omitted variable) bias and the 
measurement error (in independent variables).  
We report results based on two estimation techniques. The system GMM (SGMM) approach 
of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is used to control for the 
endogeneity bias, measurement bias, unobserved country fixed effects, and other potentially 
omitted variables. Relative to the difference GMM, SGMM is robust to weak instrument bias. It 
uses suitable lagged levels and lagged first differences of the regressors as their instruments. To 
minimize the number of GMM-style instruments used, we restrict the maximum lags of 
dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments to one. In accordance with GMM 
estimation techniques, Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the Arellano-Bond test that 
the average autocovariance of residuals of order two is zero are reported. Furthermore, in 
instances where two step estimator is used, we report results based on robust standard errors
Fixed effects (FE) estimation captures country-specific factors influencing economic growth 
not otherwise captured by the independent variables. One assumption of the FE model is that the 
time-variant characteristics are unique to each country and that they are not correlated with 
another country’s characteristics. This assumption holds if the countries’ error terms are not 
correlated. However, if the error terms are correlated, the assumption does not hold and the FE 
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model cannot be used. Consequently, we conduct the Hausman specification test to determine 
whether to use random or fixed effects. The test rejects the null hypothesis that the difference in 
random and fixed effects coefficients are not systematic, thereby affirming fixed effects as the 
model of choice. To control for potential heteroscedasticity, we report results based on robust 
standard errors. In both SGMM and FE models, time dummies are included to remove universal 
time-related shocks from the errors (Roodman, 2006).
3.1.Data 
The regressionanalysis is conducted using a sample of 26 SSA LDCs (including 25 HIPCs) 
over the period 1984-2010 (the sampling period is limited by the availability of data). GDP per 
capita is expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms and constant 2005 international 
dollars. Government consumption spending and investment spending are both measured as a 
percentage of PPP converted GDP per capita at 2005 constant prices. Openness is expressed as 
trade volume (exports plus imports) as a percentage of PPP converted GDP per capita at 2005 
constant prices. All four aforementioned variables were collected from the Penn World Table 
version 7.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aton, 2012). 
Data on net official development assistance received as a percentage of GDP(in constant 
2009 US$), net bilateral aid flows from DAC donors [Total bilateral aid and bilateral aid from
France, United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU)] as a percentage of GDP (in current 
US$), net official flows from United Nations (UN) agencies (UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, 
UNICEF, UNTA and WFP) as a percentage of GDP (in current US$), financial development 
[measured by money and quasi money (M2) as a percentage of GDP], fuel exports and 
ores/metals exports (both measured as a percentage of merchandise exports), population growth, 
and the annual (CPI) inflation rate were obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (2013). Terms of trade indices data were downloaded from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade Development (2013). The governance index that represents institutional 
factors was collected from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011). 
The countries in the samplewith the corresponding legal origin are listed in Table 1A. Table 
1B contains the descriptive statistics for the selected variables of the growth regressions. The 
correlation matrix is shown in Table 1C. The average share of initial net official development 
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assistance (ODA) received in GDP in our sample of 26 Africa’s LDCs between 1984 and 2010 
was 30% with a standard deviation of 23%. Guinea Bissau had the highest initial ODA during 
this period (78% of GDP); while Sudan had the lowest share (12% of GDP). A large proportion 
of ODA flowing into these countries is bilateral in nature, as evidenced by the comparatively 
large share of this type of aid in GDP (20%) over the sampling period. Bilateral aid from EU 
member countries, France and United Kingdom, average 2%, 1.9% and 0.8% of GDP, 
respectively. Aid from UN agencies averagedless than one percent of GDP during the sampling 
period. The agency that provided the highest ODA (among those included in this study) was 
World Food Programs (WFP) (0.7% of GDP), with United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)
contributing the lowest (0.07% of GDP). The importance of other key growth determinants such 
as trade, domestic investment and level of financial development were either close to or above 
the share of ODA in GDP. For example the share of trade in GDP was approximately 54%, 
investment and financial development shares averaged around 16% and 21%, respectively.
IV. RESULTS
Results based on the baseline specification defined in equation (1) are reported in Tables2A
and 3A for SGMM and FE estimation techniques, respectively. Using a modified version of 
equation (1), we evaluate foreign aid effectiveness on economic growth within the framework of 
a country’s legal origin by interacting the aid variables with the dummy variables for the French 
(dFrench) and British (dBrisith) legal origins. Under the assumption that the legal origin of a 
country can be a good predictor of the nature and efficiency of institutions and policies (La Porta 
et al, 2008), the interaction terms allow us to observe the importance of policies and institutions 
(as suggested in Burnside and Dollar, 2002 and Dalgaard et al., 2004) on aid effectiveness 
without introducing complex proxies. The results based on this modified equation are 
summarized in Tables 2B (SGMM) and 3B (FE). Our discussions below start with the SGMM 
model results followed by FE in section 4.3.
4.1. Does quantity of foreign aid matter to economic growth?
The takeoff hypothesis literature advocates for increased flow of foreign aid to poor countries 
(Sachs, 2005). A reasonable and sustained flow of foreign aid is necessary to help poor countries 
meet and surpass the threshold capital stock, which is needed for the takeoff into the self 
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sustained growth (UNDP, 2005; IMF and World Bank, 2005). To test this hypothesis, we include 
both linear and quadratic specifications of the total aid (ODA) variablein the regression model 
(Table 2A, column 1). As expected, the linear specification has a negative sign, while that on the 
quadratic specification is positive. However, only the quadratic specification is significant, albeit 
at 10% level. 
To assess whether the quantity effects of aid differ based on a country’s legal origin, we 
interact both the linear and quadratic specifications of aid with dummy variables for French and 
British legal origins. Results are summarized in Tables 2B, column 1. Both the linear and 
quadratic specifications have the expected signs.Specifically, a one percentage point increase in 
the initial share of aid in GDP reduces growth for the subsequent three years by approximately 
0.12% and 0.07% in the former French and British colonies respectively. When the share of aid 
in GDP is doubled, the marginal effects on growth are robust only in the former British colonies 
(with a magnitude of approximately 0.001%).
Anecdotal evidence from micro-level project impact evaluationsand findings in empirical 
studies - that large amounts of aid flows to a country can yield growth enhancing effects – are in 
line with the observed positive effects from the quadratic specification.  For example, a World 
Bank (2003) study found that countries with aid levels above 20% of their income (most of them 
in Africa), increased their per capita GDP on average by 1.3% per year over the period of 1995-
2000. Other success stories from countries such as Uganda and Mozambique show that increased 
shares of aid in GDP (above 20%) coincided with positive growth rates in the 1990s (Mavrotas, 
2007). Nevertheless, our findingssuggest that the argument of whether or not to increase the 
current flow of foreign aid to Africa’s LDCs cannot be generalized. While doubling foreign aid 
flows may have noticeable benefitsin countries with British legal origin, such effects may not be 
felt in former French colonies. 
4.2. Does the quality of foreign aid matter to economic growth?
The next argument is whether or not the quality of aid matters to economic growth. Previous 
studies that attempted to address the quality of aid impact on growth concluded that aid flows 
based on geostrategic factors have neutral effects on growth, while non-geostrategic aid has 
growth enhancing effects (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bobba and Powell, 2007). In this 
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study, we employ two categories of proxies for quality of aid; bilateral aid and multilateral aid. 
Generally we expect bilateral aid to be geostrategically driven and hence, have negative effects 
on growth. On the other hand, we assume that the impact of multilateral aidon growthdepends on 
the goals of the agencies providing the aid. In Table 2A, columns 2-4 we report the results of 
total bilateral aid, bilateral aid from France, UK and EU, respectively. In all specifications, we 
observenon-robust negative effects, with the exception of bilateral aid from France, which is 
robust at 10% level. When total bilateral aid and EU aid variables are interacted with the 
dummies for French and British legal origins (Table 2B, columns 2-3), both the French-aid 
interaction terms have negative signs. Nevertheless, the growth retarding effects are statistically 
significant only in the case of total bilateral aid. In the case of British-aid interactions, robust 
effects are present only with theEU aid. In other words, increasing initial total bilateral aid by 
1% hurts economic growth of former French colonies by 0.02% for the next three years, with 
neutral effects in former British colonies. But, when initial bilateral aid from EU member 
countries is increased by the same 1%, it is the former British colonies that benefit, with a 0.7% 
boost in growth of their real GDP per capita for the subsequent three years. 
In Table 2A column 5, the results for the multilateral aid from six UN agencies namely 
UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNTA and WFP are reported.Aid flows from UNDP and 
WFP enhance economic growth of the countries in our sample. Notwithstanding, aid flows from 
the rest of the agencies have negative effects and significant only in the case of UNHCR and 
UNTA. When the aid variables are interacted with the dummies for French and British legal 
origins (Table 2B, column 5), we observe the following; 1) in the former French colonies, 
theonly aid with robust, albeit growth retarding effects, is from UNTA agency. 2) Aid from four 
of the six UN agencies included in this study has statistically significant effects in the LDCs with 
British legal origin. Specifically, an increase in the share of aid from UNDP and UNICEF boosts
economic growth of former British colonies, while that from UNHCR and UNTA retards their 
growth. Clemens et al. (2004) found that aid allocated to sectors such as agriculture, industry and 
public infrastructure investment tend to have immediate impact on growth, relative to aid 
supporting democracy, environment, health and education, which usually has postponed/late 
impact on growth.Overall, the economic effects of multilateral aid are largely robust in the 
former British colonies relative to the French colonies. 
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The estimated coefficients of the control variables in Table 2, where significant, are
consistent with the findings in the empirical growth literature (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Barro, 
1998; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). In all specification, we observe the presence of beta 
convergence within the sample as signified by the negative sign of the coefficient of the initial 
per capita GDP. Initial investment, financial development, governance (proxied by the Polity2 
variable), fiscal policy (government consumption spending), shares of fuels and ores in 
merchandise exports, terms of trade growth, and, population growth are found to stimulate 
growth over the 3-year period where significant. 
The robust positive effect of initial institutional quality on growth is in line with existing 
work on the role of institutions in developing countries (Green, 2011; Sachs and Warner, 1997). 
Notwithstanding, the positive sign on the inflation measure and government consumption 
spending contradicts the negative link found in cross-country growth regressions (e.g., Barro, 
1996; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004; Gomanee et al., 2005), although some studies have found 
favorable effects in the case of government consumption spending (Yasin, 2003). 
4.3. FE Estimation Results
We also provide results based on FE estimations (Tables 3A and 3B). In most specifications, 
the findings are consistent with those established under SGMM estimations in Table 2. In Table 
3A (column 1), the total aid variables have the expected signs. However, only the quadratic term 
is significant. When we introduce the interaction terms (Table 3B), the quadratic specification
maintain its positive sign, with robust effects observed in both former French and British 
colonies. The linear specification on the other hand, is now robust with positive effects but, only 
in the former French colonies. 
With reference to the quality of aid measures, total bilateral aid and bilateral aid from UK 
have significant and positive effects, while aid flows from France and EU member countries 
have neutral effects (Table 3A, columns 2-4). Introducing the French and British dummy 
interactions with total and EU bilateral aid measures yields significant effects only in the case of 
EU aid. These effects are positive in the former British colonies, but, negative in the former 
French colonies (Table 3B, columns 3). In the case of multilateral aid, aid from UNDP, UNHCR 
and WFP also maintain their significant effects as previously established under SGMM, with 
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UNDP and WFP having favorable effects on economic growth while UNHCR having 
unfavorable effects (Table 3A, column 5). The results for the interaction terms in Table 3B 
(column 4), where significant, also mirror those of SGMM in terms of direction of effects. 
Specifically, UNDP and UNHCR aid has positive and negative effects respectively, in the former 
French colonies. With reference to the former British colonies, increasing the share of UNHCR 
and UNTA aid inGDP retards their economic growth, similar to what was observed in the 
SGMM estimations.   
4.4. Does including investment and government consumption spending in the regression 
model alter the aid impact on growth?
Studies on the transmission mechanism of foreign aid effects on growth have pointed to 
investment and government consumption spending as the possible channels. As previously 
noted, most of these studies have emphasized on investment spending. White (2007) asserted 
that empirical models, which include both aid and investment on the right hand side, risk ruling 
out the major channel through which aid might affect growth and therefore, underestimate the 
aid effects. To test this assertion, we excluded investment and government consumption 
spending from the regression models using stepwise regression. Nevertheless, excluding these 
two variables did not significantly alter the effects of aid on growth relative to those previously 
established in models including the two variables. We summarize some of the results in table 413. 
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of foreign aid effectiveness in developing countries has continued to puzzle many 
policy makers and donors alike, especially, the inability of African economies to duplicate the 
Asian growth miracle, and, wean themselves from foreign aid dependency. Critiques have been 
quick to point fingers at both the donors and governments of recipient countries for self-serving 
motives at the expense of the needy.Yetproponents continue to advocate for increased aid flows 
to poor nations. As previously noted, many empirical studies have attempted to establish the 
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Additional results are available upon request. 
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nature of the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. So far the findings are 
mixed and the resulting policy recommendations are conflicting. 
In this study, we argue that both quantity and quality of aid matters to economic growth of 
Africa’s LDCs. In addition, we show that these effects differ based on a country’s legal origin. 
Due to lack of appropriate data, we use source based variables as proxy for quality of aid. The 
quantity of aid is proxied by introducing a quadratic specification in the estimation model. Our 
findings point to the following conclusions: 1) Quantity of aid matters in those Africa’s LDCs 
with British legal origin. 2) The effects of bilateral and multilateral aid differ in former French 
and British colonies, with growth retarding effects mostly in those countries with French legal 
origin. 3) Growth enhancing effects regardless of the aid specification are more likely to be 
present in the former British relative to former French colonies. 4) Multilateral aid from UNDP, 
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Table 1A: Sample Africa LDCs
Benin* Guinea-Bissau* Rwanda*
Burkina Faso* Lesotho** Senegal*
Burundi* Liberia** Sierra Leone**
Central African Republic* Madagascar* Sudan**
Chad* Malawi** Togo*
Congo, Dem. Rep.* Mali* Uganda**
Ethiopia Mauritania* Zambia**
Gambia, The** Mozambique Comoros*
Guinea* Niger*
Note: * French Legal Origin. ** British Legal Origin
Table 1B: Descriptive Statistics for Selected Regression Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max N
Real GDP per Capita Growth (Ln) 0.65 5.43 -23.22 39.42 234
ODA (% of GDP) 29.98 22.62 3.02 172.21 224
Total Bilateral Aid (% of GDP) 20.45 67.23 0.13 692.60 225
UNDP (% of GDP) 0.38 0.38 0.01 2.44 233
UNFPA (% of GDP) 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.49 233
UNHCR (% of GDP) 0.17 0.49 0.00 5.86 233
UNICEF (% 0f GDP) 0.24 0.44 0.00 5.68 233
UNTA (% of GDP) 0.13 0.17 0.00 1.22 233
WFP (% of GDP) 0.73 3.17 0.00 41.13 233
France Aid (% of GDP) 1.93 2.26 -0.13 12.23 233
UK Aid (% of GDP) 0.82 6.01 -0.16 79.05 233
EU Aid (% of GDP) 1.97 1.82 0.03 10.94 233
Inflation 2.35 1.22 -0.18 7.42 210
Financial Development. 20.51 9.06 0.92 55.20 223
Openness 54.46 30.27 9.11 182.13 234
Polity2 -1.54 5.95 -10.00 19.00 231
TOT-growth 1.22 35.22 -239.72 245.94 234
Fiscal 14.19 9.97 2.42 58.64 234
Investment 16.47 9.76 0.72 61.71 234
Fuel 2.35 10.07 0.00 94.37 234
Ores 9.74 20.90 0.00 88.81 234
Pop-growth 2.65 1.25 -7.53 8.80 234
Note: The real GDP per capita growth and TOT growth are averaged over 3-year period. All other variables are 
initial values at the beginning of the period for the sample of 1984-2010. 
29
Table 1C: Correlation/Covariance Matrix for Selected Regression Variables
Growth ODA Bilateral UNDP UNFPA UNHCR UNICEF UNTA WFP France UK EU 
Real GDP per Capita 
Growth (Ln) 1
ODA (% of GDP) 0.18 1
Bilateral Aid (% of 
GDP) 0.03 0.40 1
UNDP (% of GDP) 0.01 0.57 0.56 1
UNFPA (% of GDP) 0.01 0.35 0.15 0.30 1
UNHCR (% of GDP) -0.16 0.38 -0.04 0.07 0.05 1
UNICEF (% 0f GDP) 0.03 0.56 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.77 1
UNTA (% of GDP) -0.05 0.47 0.31 0.60 0.33 0.53 0.65 1
WFP (% of GDP) 0.04 0.53 0.03 0.19 0.01 0.80 0.92 0.62 1
France Aid (% of 
GDP) 0.00 0.30 0.12 0.17 0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 1
UK Aid (% of GDP) 0.03 0.36 0.89 0.41 0.13 -0.04 0.06 0.19 0.01 0.11 1
EU Aid (% of GDP) 0.09 0.54 0.14 0.36 0.50 0.23 0.37 0.51 0.25 0.10 0.07 1
Inflation -0.03 0.04 0.11 0.09 -0.13 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.30 0.11 -0.03
Financial Dev. 0.13 0.27 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.06 0.11 0.20
Openness 0.07 0.07 -0.11 -0.03 0.14 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.11 0.05
Polity2 -0.08 0.27 0.31 0.42 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.11 0.11 0.27 0.10
TOT-growth 0.14 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.06 -0.08 -0.06 0.03
Fiscal 0.18 -0.02 -0.10 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.08 -0.15 -0.05 0.11 -0.08 0.02
Investment 0.21 0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 -0.03 0.12 -0.02
Fuel 0.11 -0.13 -0.06 -0.19 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09 -0.14 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.13
Ores 0.10 -0.13 -0.06 -0.27 -0.04 -0.05 -0.10 -0.15 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 0.01
Pop-growth 0.27 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.08 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.14 0.04 -0.05 0.01
Note: The real GDP per capita growth and TOT growth are averaged over 3-year period. All other variables are 
initial values at the beginning of the period for the sample of 1984-2010. 
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Table 2A: Foreign Aid Effects on Real GDP per capita Growth of Africa’s LDCS (3-year averaged), 1984-2010. 
SGMM Estimation. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real GDP per Capita Growth (Ln) -19.581*** -29.14*** -26.45*** -28.40*** -25.558***
(8.628) (2.501) (2.901) (2.296) (5.039)
ODA (% of GDP) -0.040
(0.077)
ODA2 (% of GDP) 0.0008*
(0.0004)
Total Bilateral Aid (% of GDP) -0.005
(0.004)
France Aid (% of GDP) -0.436*
(0.236)
UK Aid (% of GDP) -0.004
(0.027)
EU Aid (% of GDP) -0.079
(0.198)
UNDP (% of GDP) 5.199*
(2.785)
UNFPA (% of GDP) -4.314
(10.87)
UNHCR (% of GDP) -5.861***
(1.832)
UNICEF (% 0f GDP) -2.845
(3.397)
UNTA (% of GDP) -12.01**
(4.786)
WFP (% of GDP) 1.510***
(0.488)
Inflation 0.965 0.489 0.793 0.414 0.398
(0.640) (0.430) (0.646) (0.413) (0.375)
Financial Dev. 0.145* 0.080 0.189* 0.077 0.121**
(0.083) (0.050) (0.103) (0.051) (0.060)
Openness -0.004 -0.011 0.010 0.004 -0.009
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Polity2 0.089 0.131* 0.149** 0.109* 0.134*
(0.071) (0.067) (0.066) (0.062) (0.073)
TOT-growth 0.024 0.0513*** 0.0408*** 0.0505*** 0.041**
(0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
Fiscal 0.194*** 0.160*** 0.253*** 0.159*** 0.116*
(0.071) (0.043) (0.085) (0.041) (0.062)
Investment 0.125* 0.146*** 0.130*** 0.127*** 0.091*
(0.064) (0.042) (0.050) (0.048) (0.054)
Fuel 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.074*** 0.059*** 0.027
(0.020) (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.028)
Ores 0.030** 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.030** 0.031**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
Pop-growth 1.442*** 1.379** 1.950*** 1.293*** 1.645***
(0.466) (0.559) (0.693) (0.492) (0.376)
Observations 157 154 160 160 137
Number of country 25 26 26 26 26
Sargan Test (Prob>chi2) 0.556 0.668 0.684 0.712 0.4
Arellano-Bond (Pr>z) 0.411 0.286 0.331 0.286 0.593
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note (Table 2A and 2B) : All variables (with the exception of TOT growth) are measured as initial values at the beginning of the 3-year period. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 has H0: no autocorrelation. All 
values are based on a two-step estimator with exception of Column 5 (Table 2A) and columns 1 and 4 (Table 2B) equations. Maximum lags of dependent and 
predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited to 1
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Table 2B: Foreign Aid Effects on Real GDP per capita Growth of Africa’s LDCS, disaggregated by legal code of origin (3-year averaged), 
1984-2010. SGMM Estimation. 
(1) '(2) (3) (4)
Real GDP per Capita Growth (Ln) -28.601*** -4.931** -6.617*** -17.034
(5.037) (2.615) (2.698) (4.279)
dFrench*ODA (% of GDP) -0.119***
(0.041)
dBritish*ODA (% of GDP) -0.067**
(0.032)
dFrench*ODA2(% of GDP) 0.0008
(0.0006)
dBritish*ODA2 (% of GDP) 0.001**
(0.0003)
dFrench*Bilateral (% of GDP) -0.017***
(0.002)
dBritish*Bilateral (% of GDP) -0.021
(0.045)
dFrench*EU Aid (% of GDP) -0.031
(0.163)
dBritish*EU Aid (% of GDP) 0.713**
(0.329)
dFrench*UNDP 9% of GDP) 3.920
(2.523)
dBritish *UNDP (% of GDP) 9.588***
(3.195)
dFrench*UNFPA (% of GDP) -5.026
(12.640)
dBritish*UNFPA (% of GDP) -19.310
(13.720)
dFrench*UNHCR (% of GDP) 0.027
(2.065)
dBritish*UNHCR (% of GDP) -7.834***
(1.652)
dFrench*UNICEF (% of GDP) 0.619
(3.535)
dBrithish *UNICEF (% of GDP) 16.58***
(3.885)
dFrench*UNTA (% of GDP) -8.765*
(4.923)
dBritish*UNTA (% of GDP) -21.86***
(6.861)
dFrench*WFP (% of GDP) -1.483
(0.956)
dBritish*WFP (% of GDP) -0.645
(0.562)
Inflation 0.532 1.541*** 0.937** 0.224
(0.394) (0.385) (0.387) (0.331)
Financial Dev. 0.204*** 0.148** 0.171*** 0.150***
(0.054) (0.059) (0.061) (0.048)
Openness -0.022* -0.027** -0.007 -0.006
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015 (0.011)
Polity2 0.193** 0.146* 0.049 0.078
(0.083) (0.077) (0.045) (0.065)
TOT-growth 0.010 -0.025 -0.011 0.029
(0.023) (0.031) (0.036) (0.018)
Fiscal 0.227*** 0.113* 0.143** 0.198***
(0.061) (0.058) (0.057) (0.048)
Investment 0.142** 0.111** 0.025 0.056
(0.055) (0.051) (0.044) (0.043)
Fuel 0.043 0.008 0.0230* 0.040*
(0.029) (0.016) (0.013) (0.024)
Ores 0.035*** 0.017 0.025 0.024*
(0.014) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013)
Pop-growth 1.618*** 1.085*** 0.986*** 1.091***
(0.425) (0.227) (0.263) (0.288)
Observations 134 130 137 160
Number of country 25 26 26 26
Sargan Test (Prob>chi2) 0.304 0.288 0.596 0.551
Arellano-Bond (Pr>z) 0.223 0.377 0.27 0.435
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3A: Foreign Aid Effects on Real GDP per capita Growth of Africa’s LDCS (3-year averaged), 1984-2010. FE Estimation. 
(1) '(2) (3) (4) '(5)
Real GDP per Capita Growth (Ln) -4.666* -7.817*** -7.281** -6.833** -5.889**
(2.366) (2.630) (2.721) (2.655) (2.857)
ODA (% of GDP) -0.090
(0.074)
ODA2 (% of GDP) 0.001***
(0.0004)
Total Bilateral Aid (% of GDP) 0.011***
(0.003)
France Aid (% of GDP) 0.317
(0.231)
UK Aid (% of GDP) 0.086***
(0.026)
EU Aid (% of GDP) 0.129
(0.266)
UNDP (% of GDP) 4.867**
(2.215)
UNFPA (% of GDP) 0.660
(7.974)
UNHCR (% of GDP) -4.770**
(1.791)
UNICEF (% 0f GDP) -2.066
(2.957)
UNTA (% of GDP) -0.858
(3.528)
WFP (% of GDP) 0.835***
(0.257)
Inflation 0.242 0.628 0.639 0.724 0.324
(0.455) (0.649) (0.627) (0.616) (0.595)
Financial Dev. 0.008 0.120 0.088 0.096 0.044
(0.053) (0.080) (0.089) (0.078) (0.053)
Openness -0.008 0.014 0.006 0.012 0.006
(0.039) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
Polity2 0.039 0.015 0.018 0.037 -0.019
(0.064) (0.084) (0.078) (0.083) (0.080)
TOT-growth 0.011 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.006
(0.015) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Fiscal 0.173 0.085 0.100 0.082 0.070
(0.107) (0.086) (0.071) (0.087) (0.082)
Investment 0.136** 0.177*** 0.151** 0.167** 0.139**
(0.060) (0.063) (0.069) (0.072) (0.067)
Fuel 0.0349* 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.004
(0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.015)
Ores 0.028 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.025
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.025)
Pop-growth 0.883 1.198 1.123 1.106 1.061
(0.674) (0.955) (0.922) (0.931) (0.776)
Constant 26.040 40.58** 38.03** 34.96** 30.00*
(15.930) (15.330) (15.500) (15.300) (17.510)
R-squared 0.42 0.369 0.351 0.339 0.438
Observations 196 191 199 199 199
Number of country 25 26 26 26 26
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note (Table 3A and 3B) : All variables (with the exception of TOT growth) are measured as initial values at the beginning of the 3-year period. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3B: Foreign Aid Effects on Real GDP per capita Growth of Africa’s LDCS, disaggregated by legal code of origin (3-year averaged), 
1984-2010. FE Estimation. 
(1) '(2) (3) (4)
Real GDP per Capita Growth (Ln) -13.42*** -6.982*** -5.439* -8.035*
(3.853) (2.295) (2.775) (4.205)
dFrench*ODA (% of GDP) 0.0778*
(0.041)
dBritish*ODA (% of GDP) -0.047
(0.030)
dFrench*ODA2(% of GDP) 0.0004*
(0.0002)
dBritish*ODA2 (% of GDP) 0.001***
(0.0003)
dFrench*Bilateral (% of GDP) 0.001
(0.005)
dBritish*Bilateral (% of GDP) 0.196
(0.142)
dFrench*EU Aid (% of GDP) 1.785*
(1.016)
dBritish*EU Aid (% of GDP) -0.773*
(0.411)
dFrench*UNDP 9% of GDP) 5.366***
(1.908)
dBritish *UNDP (% of GDP) 5.233
(4.466)
dFrench*UNFPA (% of GDP) -1.078
(11.250)
dBritish*UNFPA (% of GDP) -37.730
(26.260)
dFrench*UNHCR (% of GDP) -2.293**
(0.887)
dBritish*UNHCR (% of GDP) -7.626**
(3.610)
dFrench*UNICEF (% of GDP) -5.875
(4.271)
dBrithish *UNICEF (% of GDP) 13.130
(7.753)
dFrench*UNTA (% of GDP) -4.548
(3.479)
dBritish*UNTA (% of GDP) -15.51*
(9.034)
dFrench*WFP (% of GDP) -0.041
(1.042)
dBritish*WFP (% of GDP) -0.604
(0.807)
Inflation 0.212 1.243 0.526 0.414
(0.449) (0.775) (0.417) (0.551)
Financial Dev. 0.058 0.317 0.276 0.091
(0.063) (0.197) (0.169) (0.063)
Openness 0.037 0.044 0.019 -0.003
(0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026)
Polity2 -0.009 0.045 0.088 0.039
(0.117) (0.111) (0.073) (0.073)
TOT-growth -0.015 0.023 0.0450*** 0.018
(0.039) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014)
Fiscal 0.082 0.128 0.228* 0.113
(0.098) (0.126) (0.129) (0.114)
Investment 0.075 0.142* 0.062 0.123
(0.069) (0.072) (0.091) (0.075)
Fuel 0.038* 0.029* 0.029 0.030
(0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Ores 0.067** 0.044 0.031 0.0348*
(0.028) (0.031) (0.024) (0.020)
Pop-growth 1.138 1.385 1.340* 1.097*
(0.680) (0.823) (0.707) (0.597)
Constant 74.33*** 22.900 17.580 43.430
(24.310) (15.300) (17.750) (26.350)
R-squared 156 151 160 178
Observations 0.565 0.443 0.478 0.581
Number of country 25 26 26 26
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Foreign Aid Effects on Real GDP per capita Growth of Africa’s LDCS (3-year averaged) (Excluding 
investment and government consumption spending), 1984-2010. SGMM Estimation. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real GDP per Capita Growth (Ln) -19.051*** -22.91*** -22.32*** -22.43*** -21.843***
(2.218) (1.983) (1.994) (2.006) (4.638)
ODA (% of GDP) -0.058
(0.039)
ODA2 (% of GDP) 0.0008***
(0.0003)
Total Bilateral Aid (% of GDP) -0.004
(0.004)
France Aid (% of GDP) -0.426**
(0.187)
UK Aid (% of GDP) 0.013
(0.020)
EU Aid (% of GDP) -0.045
(0.173)
UNDP (% of GDP) 5.344**
(2.702)
UNFPA (% of GDP) -2.153
(10.640)
UNHCR (% of GDP) -7.611***
(1.620)
UNICEF (% 0f GDP) -2.056
(3.379)
UNTA (% of GDP) -13.04***
(4.735)
WFP (% of GDP) 1.642***
(0.486)
Inflation 0.430 0.562 0.432 0.449 0.260
(0.461) (0.424) (0.438) (0.416) (0.372)
Financial Dev. 0.049 0.059 0.063 0.053 0.107**
(0.044) (0.049) (0.047) (0.051) (0.054)
Openness 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.0149* -0.001
(0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Polity2 0.045 0.050 0.042 0.032 0.098
(0.052) (0.059) (0.058) (0.056) (0.072)
TOT-growth 0.025 0.0377** 0.0299* 0.0385** 0.0339*
(0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019)
Fuel 0.0238*** 0.0364*** 0.0320*** 0.0317*** 0.015
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.027)
Ores 0.018 0.0235** 0.0212** 0.0217* 0.0318**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
Pop-growth 0.961** 1.059 1.064* 1.018* 1.352***
(0.416) (0.647) (0.583) (0.577) (0.354)
Observations 157 154 160 160 137
Number of country 25 26 26 26 26
Sargan Test (Prob>chi2) 0.417 0.593 0.345 0.623 0.444
Arellano-Bond (Pr>z) 0.326 0.330 0.353 0.323 0.367
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note : All variables (with the exception of TOT growth) are measured as initial values at the beginning of the 3-year period. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 has H0: no autocorrelation. All values are 
based on a two-step estimator with exception of Column 5 equations. Maximum lags of dependent and predetermined variables for use as instruments are limited 
to 1
